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ABSTRACT
When the Second Circuit decided McKithen v. Brown, it joined
an ever-growing list of courts faced with a difficult and pressing
issue of both constitutional and criminal law: is there a federal
constitutional right of post-conviction access to evidence for DNA
testing? This issue, which sits at the intersection of new forensic
technologies and fundamental principles of constitutional due
process, has divided the courts. The Second Circuit, wary of
reaching a hasty conclusion, remanded McKithen’s case to the
district court for consideration. The district court for the Eastern
District of New York was asked to decide whether a constitutional
right of access to evidence for DNA testing exists both broadly as
well as under the defendant’s circumstances. This iBrief concludes
that although a due process post-conviction right of access to
evidence for DNA testing may exist under some circumstances, it
does not exist under current constitutional jurisprudence in
McKithen’s case.

INTRODUCTION
Any interpretation of the protections afforded by constitutional due
process must evolve with the circumstances underlying modern criminal
convictions. 2 Scientific progress requires that constitutional values be
reexamined in light of new technological developments, especially when
science delivers technology that can conclusively exonerate the wrongly
convicted. 3 This iBrief addresses a question which has been described as

¶1
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See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 415 (1819) (“[The] constitution
[was] intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to
the various crises of human affairs.”).
3
See Harvey v. Horan (Harvey II), 285 F.3d 298, 305 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig, J.,
respecting the denial of rehearing en banc); The Innocence Project, About Us:
Mission Statement, http://www.innocenceproject.org/about/MissionStatement.php (last visited Aug. 18, 2008).

2008

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 7

“one of the most important criminal law issues of our day.” 4 One judge
grappling with this question framed it as follows: does “there exist[] under
the Constitution of the United States a right, post-conviction, to access
previously-produced forensic evidence for purposes of . . . DNA testing in
order to establish—before the executive, if not also before the courts—
one’s complete innocence of the crime for which [one] has been convicted
and sentenced.” 5 Such a right, if it exists, would arise under the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which act to
protect individuals’ liberty and to guard them against arbitrary and improper
governmental action. 6
Post-conviction DNA testing has the capacity to provide reliable
and concrete demonstrations of factual innocence.7 As of August 2008, 216
individuals have been conclusively exonerated through post-conviction
DNA testing in the United States. 8 Sixteen of these individuals had served
time on death row. 9 Wrongful convictions, though not abundant, are by no
means isolated or unusual events. 10
¶2

¶3
Current forensic DNA technology is categorically different from all
other technologies preceding it. 11 There is a consensus among the scientific
community that DNA technology has the power to distinguish between any
two individuals on the planet (saving, of course, identical twins). 12 DNA
testing is most commonly performed on samples from skin, blood, saliva,
hair and semen. 13 Established techniques of analysis can yield reliable

4

Harvey II, 285 F.3d at 304 (Luttig, J., respecting the denial of rehearing en
banc).
5
Id. Others, in an attempt to disparage such a right, have defined it as a
“general constitutional right for every inmate to continually challenge a valid
conviction based on whatever technological advances may have occurred since
his conviction became final.” Harvey v. Horan (Harvey I), 278 F.3d 370, 375
(4th Cir. 2002). This, however, is not the appropriate level of inquiry. See
Harvey II, 285 F.3d at 310 (Luttig, J., respecting the denial of rehearing en
banc).
6
U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also McKithen v.
Brown, 481 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 2007).
7
NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, POSTCONVICTION DNA
TESTING: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HANDLING REQUESTS vi (1999); The
Innocence Project, About Us, http://www.innocenceproject.org/about/ (last
visited Aug. 18, 2008).
8
The Innocence Project, About Us: Mission Statement, supra note 3.
9
Id.
10
See The Innocence Project, About Us, supra note 7.
11
Harvey II, 285 F.3d 298, 305 n.1 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig, J., respecting the
denial of rehearing en banc).
12
Id.
13
See NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 7, at xiii.

2008

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 7

results from as little as a single cell. 14 More commonly, between 50 and
100 cells are needed to provide conclusive information. 15 Though DNA
technology in the U.S. is only used regularly in rape and homicide cases,
where it has the most probative value, it can also be used to make
identifications based on cells left behind on items touched by a
perpetrator. 16 Due to the statistical improbability of a DNA match between
any two individuals, in certain cases, an adequately powered testing
procedure is capable of conclusively exonerating an individual to a practical
certainty. 17
¶4
Advances in forensic DNA technology have not gone unnoticed by
both federal and state legislatures. In 2004, Congress passed the Innocence
Protection Act (IPA), which is contained in the Justice for All Act of
2004. 18 The Act provides for post-conviction DNA testing in certain
federal cases, requires the preservation of biological evidence, and allocates
funds to help states finance the testing. 19 A majority of states have taken
similar measures. Forty-three states have enacted statutes providing for
some level of post-conviction DNA testing. 20 However, because not all
states have acted to provide post-conviction access to testing, and because
testing under both federal and state law is only reserved for statutorilydefined categories of cases, prisoners continue to seek post-conviction
access to DNA testing as a federal constitutional matter. 21
14

See I. Findlay et al., DNA Fingerprinting from Single Cells, 389 NATURE 555,
555 (1997).
15
See NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 7, at xv.
16
Id. at 1; Roland van Oorschor & Maxwell Jones, DNA Fingerprints from
Fingerprints, 387 NATURE 767, 767 (1997).
17
Harvey II, 285 F.3d 298, 305 n.1 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig, J., respecting the
denial of rehearing en banc).
18
Justice For All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, 118 Stat. 2260 (codified in
scattered sections of 18, 28 and 42 U.S.C.); Matthew J. Mueller, Handling
Claims of Actual Innocence: Rejecting Federal Habeas Corpus as the Best
Avenue for Addressing Claims of Innocence Based on DNA Evidence, 56 CATH.
U. L. REV. 227, 254–55 (2006). The Innocence Protection Act can be found at
Title IV of the Justice for All Act.
19
Mueller, supra note 18, at 255.
20
The Innocence Project, News and Information: Fact Sheets,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/304.php (last visited Aug. 18, 2008).
21
See, e.g, McKithen v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that
petitioner, McKithen, had sought and was denied access to DNA testing through
state avenues). For example, New York’s post-conviction DNA testing statute
provides that “[w]here the defendant's motion requests the performance of a
forensic DNA test on specified evidence, and upon the court's determination that
any evidence containing deoxyribonucleic acid (“DNA”) was secured in
connection with the trial resulting in the judgment, the court shall grant the
application for forensic DNA testing of such evidence upon its determination
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In March of 2007, the Second Circuit found itself “at this
intersection of scientific advance and enduring constitutional values.” 22 In
McKithen v. Brown, 23 the Second Circuit was invited to determine whether
the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee
a right to post-conviction DNA testing. 24 The Second Circuit temporarily
declined to answer the question, remanding the case to the district court for
its consideration. This iBrief considers the question with which the district
court was charged and concludes that even if one accepts all of the
arguments posited for the existence of such a constitutional right, McKithen
is nevertheless precluded from relief under a theory of a due process right of
post-conviction DNA testing.
¶5

I. MCKITHEN V. BROWN
¶6
In 1993, McKithen was convicted of attempted murder and related
charges. 25 The prosecution’s theory was that McKithen appeared at the
apartment he once shared with his estranged wife, ran to the kitchen and
grabbed a knife, stabbed his wife in the lower back as she was fleeing out of
a window, and fled the apartment. 26 A distinctive knife, which McKithen’s
wife identified as the weapon used on her, was admitted into evidence at

that if a DNA test had been conducted on such evidence, and if the results had
been admitted in the trial resulting in the judgment, there exists a reasonable
probability that the verdict would have been more favorable to the defendant.”
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW. § 440.30(1-a)(a) (McKinney 2004). As was the
situation in McKithen’s case, the court made a determination that “there is no
reasonable probability that the results of such testing would have resulted in a
verdict more favorable to [McKithen].” McKithen, 481 F.3d at 94. McKithen
disagreed and asserted a right to DNA testing under separate, constitutional,
grounds. See id.
22
McKithen, 481 F.3d at 92. For a list of selected appellate courts to have
considered this issue, see infra note 24.
23
McKithen v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct.
1218 (2008), remanded to, NO. 02-CV-1670 JG LB, 2008 WL 2791852
(E.D.N.Y. Jul. 21, 2008).
24
Id. Other courts have addressed this issue, but have failed to achieve
consensus. Compare Harvey II, 285 F.3d 298, 312–15 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig,
J., respecting the denial of rehearing en banc) (“I believe, and would hold, that
there does exist such a post-conviction right of access to evidence.”), with
Harvey I, 278 F.3d 370, 388 (4th Cir. 2002) (King, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (concluding that the defendant had “no postconviction legal right to access or discover the [biological] evidence relating to
his . . . conviction”). The Eleventh Circuit declined to weigh in on “the thorny
threshold issue.” Grayson v. King, 460 F.3d 1328, 1340–41 (11th Cir. 2006).
25
McKithen, 481 F.3d at 93.
26
Id. at 93–94.
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trial, yet this knife was never subjected to DNA or fingerprint testing. 27
Seven years after his conviction, McKithen moved to compel DNA testing
of the weapon. 28 In 2002, while still incarcerated, he brought suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, 29 which provides a cause of action for persons deprived “of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.” 30 He
claimed that the district attorney had “violated his constitutional right of
post-conviction access to evidence for DNA testing” by denying him access
to the knife he sought to have tested. 31 The district court referred the case
to a magistrate judge who noted that courts have disagreed as to the
existence of any substantive or procedural right to post-conviction DNA
testing. 32 The magistrate judge ultimately concluded that McKithen’s suit
could be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and therefore
declined to reach the underlying constitutional issue. 33 The district court
adopted the recommendation of the magistrate judge, and McKithen
subsequently appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. 34
¶7
The Second Circuit was ultimately faced with the constitutional
question at hand. After analyzing applicable Supreme Court precedent and
decisions in other circuits, the Second Circuit concluded that the claim
should not have been dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 35
The Second Circuit then agreed with the Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits, and district courts in the First and Third Circuits that a claim
seeking post-conviction access to evidence for DNA testing may properly
be brought as a § 1983 suit. 36 The Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits had
previously reached the opposite conclusion. 37 The Second Circuit then
found that McKithen’s claim was not estopped by either claim or issue
27

Id.
Id.
29
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
30
McKithen, 481 F.3d at 99.
31
Id. at 94.
32
Id. at 94–95 (quoting the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation); see
also supra note 24.
33
McKithen, 481 F.3d at 95.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 99.
36
Id. For other cases holding that a claim for post-conviction access to evidence
for DNA testing may be brought as a § 1983 suit, see Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d
667, 669 (7th Cir. 2006), Osborne v. Dist. Attorney's Office, 423 F.3d 1050,
1054 (9th Cir. 2005), Bradley v. Pryor, 305 F.3d 1287, 1290-91 (11th Cir.
2002), and Wade v. Brady, 460 F.Supp.2d 226, 237 (D. Mass. 2006).
37
McKithen, 481 F.3d at 100–01. For cases holding that such a claim is may not
be brought as a § 1983 suit, see Boyle v. Mayer, 46 Fed. Appx. 340, 340 (6th
Cir. 2002) (unpublished decision), Kutzner v. Montgomery County, 303 F.3d
339, 340–41 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam), and Harvey I, 278 F.3d 370, 375 (4th
Cir. 2002).
28
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preclusion. 38 Therefore, the court was required to determine first, whether a
federal constitutional right to post-conviction DNA testing exists and
second, what its contours are. 39 Because of the “fact-intensive nature of the
inquiry” and “in light of the need to approach the issue cautiously,” the
Second Circuit remanded the case to the district court. 40
¶8
However, the Second Circuit did not leave the district court to
blindly struggle with this “extraordinarily important, and delicate,
constitutional issue.” 41 It provided guidance in its opinion for how to
proceed. First, the district court must consider whether the liberty interest
remaining after conviction already recognized in Supreme Court
jurisprudence “encompasses an interest in accessing or possessing
potentially exonerative biological evidence.” 42 Then, the Second Circuit
explained that if the district court concludes that this specific postconviction liberty interest exists, procedural due process applies to its
deprivation in the instant case. 43 The proper inquiry for analyzing
procedural due process claims begins with the framework set out by the
Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge. 44 Using the Mathews factors, the
district court should determine whether McKithen’s procedural due process
rights were violated in this instance. 45 Furthermore, the Second Circuit
noted that a constitutional right of access may derive directly from
substantive due process. 46 Because the Due Process Clause has been
construed as granting substantive rights as well as the right that appropriate
procedures be used in cases of deprivation of life, liberty, or property, the
district court must also evaluate the existence of a constitutional right of
access from a substantive due process framework. 47

38

McKithen, 481 F.3d at 104–06.
Id. at 106–07.
40
Id. at 106.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 106–07.
43
Id. at 107.
44
Id; see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
45
McKithen, 481 F.3d at 107.
46
Id. at 107 n.17.
47
Id. Judge Luttig of the Fourth Circuit has suggested that “there might well be
a straightforward substantive due process right to [access to post-conviction
DNA testing].” Harvey II, 285 F.3d 298, 318 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig, J.,
respecting the denial of rehearing en banc.). Several district courts have
embraced former Judge Luttig’s view. See, e.g., Wade v. Brady, 460 F.Supp.2d
226, 249 (D. Mass. 2006) (finding that “the Due Process Clause provides a
substantive right to post-conviction DNA testing in cases where testing could
raise serious doubts about the original verdict”).
39
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II. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AND POST-CONVICTION ACCESS TO
DNA EVIDENCE
Prisoners have two paths available to them in order to remedy
violations of their federal constitutional rights. 48 First, a prisoner may elect
to file a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 49 To qualify for habeas
relief, a prisoner must file a petition in district court alleging that “he is in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws . . . of the United States.” 50
A prisoner may alternatively seek relief by filing a suit under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, 51 which provides a civil cause of action for persons who have been
“depriv[ed] of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws.” 52
¶9

¶10
Under each of these statutes, the petitioner must allege a violation
of a constitutional right. 53 Therefore, a prisoner who can successfully assert
a constitutional right of post-conviction access to DNA evidence would be
afforded the opportunity for relief through either of these two avenues,
provided that all other procedural requirements are met. However, the law
is unsettled as to whether such a right exists and if so, as to the extent of its
reach.

The Supreme Court has never explicitly recognized the existence of
a procedural due process right of access to post-conviction DNA testing. 54
It is difficult to categorize a right of post-conviction access to DNA
evidence as a constitutional one because the concept does not fit cleanly
into any preexisting categories of recognized procedural or substantive due
process rights. 55 Yet, despite these hurdles, procedural due process grounds
for a post-conviction right of access to DNA evidence for retesting may
exist. The following arguments have been made to support a procedural
due process right of post-conviction access to DNA evidence.
¶11

A. Claims of actual innocence
¶12
A post-conviction right of access to DNA evidence is difficult to
categorize as “a right of ‘factual innocence.’” 56 The Supreme Court has
declared that though claims of actual innocence are not constitutional

48

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 480 (1994).
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006).
50
Id.
51
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
52
Id.
53
See Heck, 512 U.S. at 480.
54
See Harvey II, 285 F.3d 298, 311 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig, J., respecting the
denial of rehearing en banc).
55
Id.
56
See id. at 310.
49
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themselves, they do operate as an entry for habeas petitioners seeking to
challenge state custody over their person. 57 In Herrera v. Collins, 58 the
Supreme Court reiterated that claims of actual innocence are not themselves
constitutional; they are merely a “gateway through which a habeas
petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim
considered on the merits.” 59 The Supreme Court reaffirmed this holding in
the 2006 case of House v. Bell, 60 where the court explicitly refrained from
resolving the controversy as to whether freestanding innocence claims are
actual constitutional claims. 61
¶13
The Supreme Court has remarked that a petitioner may, in rare
circumstances, have his federal constitutional claim considered on the
merits, through the writ of habeas corpus, if he produces a sufficient
showing of actual innocence. 62 This rule is referred to as the “fundamental
miscarriage of justice” exception and is available “only where the prisoner
supplements his constitutional claim with a colorable showing of factual
innocence.” 63 The Supreme Court has not yet defined what showing would
be necessary to support a claim of actual innocence, yet it has noted that the
“threshold showing” for such a claim “would necessarily be extraordinarily
high.” 64 Concurring in the judgment in Herrera, Justice White posited that
“to be entitled to relief” a petitioner claiming actual innocence “would at the
very least be required to show that based on proffered newly discovered
evidence and the entire record before the jury that convicted him, ‘no
rational trier or fact could [find] proof of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.’” 65
¶14
An individual claiming actual innocence and seeking access to
DNA evidence does not have a constitutional claim: “[t]he existence merely
of newly discovered evidence relevant to the guilt of a state prisoner is not a
57

Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993). The position that claims of
actual innocence are not constitutional in themselves is the position taken by the
majority in Herrera. See id. However, one can deduce from the four other
opinions written in this case that five of the justices may have been willing to
find that claims of actual innocence are themselves constitutional. See id. at 427
(O’Connor & Kennedy, JJ., concurring); id. at 430 (Blackmun, Stevens, &
Souter, JJ., dissenting).
58
Herrera, 506 U.S. 390.
59
Id. at 404.
60
House v. Bell, 126 S. Ct. 2064 (2006).
61
Id. at 2086–87.
62
Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404.
63
Id. (quoting Kulhmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454) (emphasis added by the
Court in Herrera).
64
Id. at 417.
65
Id. at 429 (White, J. concurring) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
324 (1979)).

2008

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 7

ground for relief on federal habeas corpus.” 66 However, it has been
proposed that the writ of habeas corpus is deprived of its effectiveness if a
petitioner lacks the means to make a claim of actual innocence. 67 A
prisoner who needs access to DNA evidence in order to make a
constitutionally sufficient showing of actual innocence would lose the
benefit of habeas corpus protection if he could not access such evidence.
Therefore, a right of access to DNA evidence may be procedure that is
necessary for a petitioner to establish a well-supported claim of actual
innocence, which he must do to litigate the constitutionality of his detention
through habeas. 68 Such a right grounded in actual innocence would
consequently only exist if the State deprived an individual of the means
necessary to make a sufficient showing of actual innocence.
B. An extension of Brady access to exculpatory evidence
The Supreme Court first recognized a defendant’s right of access to
material, exculpatory evidence held by the prosecution in order to ensure a
fair trial in Brady v. Maryland. 69 This requirement was deemed necessary
as a matter of procedural due process, or more simply, is required by basic
fairness. 70 This constitutional right explicitly concerns only pre-trial
production by the prosecution of all evidence favorable to the accused, not
post-conviction access to evidence. 71 Moreover, the holding in Brady only
reaches evidence whose meaning is known to the prosecutor and can be
directly evaluated, not untested evidence whose significance is unknown. 72
¶15

The Supreme Court, in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 73 extended the
reach of Brady by holding that that due process required the prosecution, at
trial, to produce certain evidence whose import was unknown so that it
could be reviewed by the court to properly determine its evidentiary
¶16

66

Id. at 398 (majority opinion) (quoting Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317
(1963)).
67
See, e.g., Cherrix v. Braxton, 131 F. Supp. 2d 756, 760 (E.D. Va. 2001)
(holding that discovery of the DNA evidence in question “is reasonably
necessary [to support] the habeas petitioner’s claims of actual innocence.”);
Benjamin Vetter, Habeas, Section 1983 and Post-Conviction Access to DNA
Evidence, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 587, 590–91.
68
See Cherrix, 131 F. Supp. 2d at 760.
69
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
70
Harvey II, 285 F.3d 298, 316 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig, J., respecting the denial
of rehearing en banc).
71
See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
72
Seth F. Kreimer & David Rudovsky, Double Helix, Double Bind: Factual
Innocence and Postconviction DNA Testing, 151 U. PENN. L. REV. 547, 583
(2002).
73
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987).
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value. 74 The reach of Brady has also been extended by lower courts to
various contexts not specifically addressed by the Supreme Court’s initial
holding. 75 For example, the Ninth Circuit has held that under Brady, the
state was required to produce any exculpatory semen evidence in its
possession during a post-conviction habeas proceeding. 76 Arguments have
been made for a further extension of the holding in Brady to encompass
post-conviction access to DNA evidence. 77 Such an extension would derive
from the idea that “the very same principle of elemental fairness that
dictates pre-trial production of all potentially exculpatory evidence dictates
post-trial production of this infinitely narrower category of evidence.” 78
Similarly, it has been observed that despite the fact that the Court has not
specifically addressed the existence of a post-conviction Brady right, the
existing cases support the notion that core due process interests, including
the interests underlying the holding in Brady, do indeed survive
conviction. 79
¶17
However, the Supreme Court has further explained that evidence is
material for Brady purposes “only if there is a reasonable probability that,
had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” 80 Therefore, a right of
post-conviction access to DNA evidence based on Brady access to evidence
could only exist in circumstances where the DNA evidence sought would
have a reasonable probability of undermining confidence in the outcome of
the case. 81

C. Access to the courts
¶18
A post-conviction right of access to DNA evidence could also be
construed in terms of a due process right of meaningful access to the courts.
The Constitution guarantees the fundamental right of meaningful access to
the courts. 82 A post-conviction right of access to evidence may derive

74

Id. at 58–59.
Wade v. Brady, 460 F. Supp. 2d 226, 243 (D. Mass. 2006).
76
Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 749–50 (9th Cir. 2002).
77
See, e.g., Harvey II, 285 F.3d 298, 316 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig, J., respecting
the denial of rehearing en banc); Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 73 at 583–87.
78
Harvey II, 285 F.3d at 317 (Luttig, J., respecting the denial of rehearing en
banc).
79
Wade, 460 F. Supp. 2d. at 248 (providing an extensive discussion of this
argument).
80
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
81
For an illustration of a court implementing this analysis, see Arthur v. King,
No. 3:07-cv-319-WKW, slip op. at 6–7 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 17, 2007).
82
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977).
75
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directly from the fundamental right of access to the courts, because when an
individual is denied access to evidence needed to challenge his conviction,
he is ultimately barred from access to the courts on the merits of his case. 83
Such a substantial burden on access to the courts can be seen as constituting
a violation of constitutional due process. 84 However, Supreme Court
precedent exposes a flaw in this argument. Currently, one must present an
underlying claim on which a right of access to the courts has been denied;
one must allege actual injury. 85 The right of access to courts doctrine is
secondary in nature to an underlying claim. 86 Therefore, a right to postconviction access of DNA evidence would already need to exist for one to
assert its deprivation as an actual injury, and consequently, denial of access
to the courts.

D. Protection of a prisoner’s residual post-conviction liberty interest
¶19
A constitutional right to post-conviction DNA access may derive
from a prisoner’s residual liberty interest, an interest defined as the liberty
interest that remains after conviction. Post-conviction access to DNA
evidence may be the procedure required to adequately protect this liberty
interest. As the Second Circuit noted in McKithen, the Supreme Court has
“made clear that prisoners lawfully deprived of their freedom retain
substantive liberty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment.” 87 Though
the exact contours of this residual liberty interest are unclear, it is probable
that under current Supreme Court precedent, some portion of a prisoner’s
liberty interest both in pursuing his freedom and in being free from
confinement persist after conviction. 88
¶20
Post-conviction access to DNA evidence would arguably be needed
to adequately protect this interest. Even if further resort to the judicial
process is, under law, not available because of procedural hurdles, an
individual may still pursue his freedom through clemency. The Supreme
Court has indeed remarked that “[c]lemency is deeply rooted in our AngloAmerican tradition of law, and is the historic remedy for preventing
miscarriages of justice where judicial process has been exhausted.” 89

83

Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 72, at 565–76.
Id. at 570.
85
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996).
86
Arthur, slip op. at 9.
87
McKithen v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89, 106 (2d Cir. 2007). See Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1982) (“The mere fact that [an individual] has been
committed under proper procedures does not deprive him of all substantive
liberty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
88
See Harvey II, 285 F.3d 298, 314 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig, J., respecting the
denial of rehearing en banc).
89
Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 411–12 (1993).
84

2008

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 7

However, in order to pursue freedom from confinement through clemency,
one must access the evidence needed to present to the executive in order to
seek clemency. Therefore, procedural due process would require postconviction access to DNA evidence in order to adequately protect one’s
residual liberty interest in being free from confinement and pursuing one’s
freedom, if not from the judiciary, then from the executive. 90
¶21
Yet, even supporters of a constitutional right of post-conviction
access concede that such a right should only exist in “certain, very limited
circumstances.” 91 Proponents of such a right have argued for its existence
under circumstances where DNA testing of evidence would be probative of
the individual’s innocence. 92 Only then would a prisoner’s interests
arguably outweigh any legitimate interests the government may have in
withholding such evidence. For example, in arguing for a procedural due
process protection of post-conviction access to DNA evidence, former
Judge Luttig of the Fourth Circuit stated he would define such a right as “a
right of access to evidence for tests which, given the particular crime for
which the individual was convicted and the evidence that was offered by the
government at trial in support of the defendant’s guilt, could prove beyond
any doubt that the individual in fact did not commit the crime.” 93 Judge
Gertner, judge for the District Court for the State of Massachusetts, was
more liberal in his definition of this right, but still limited the right to
special circumstances, concluding that the “Due Process Clause provides a
substantive right to post-conviction DNA testing in cases where testing
could raise serious doubts about the original verdict.” 94

E. McKithen’s procedural due process claim
¶22
The Second Circuit remanded McKithen’s case to the district court
so that it could consider whether a post-conviction right of access to DNA
testing exists under McKithen’s circumstances and if so, whether it has been
violated. This iBrief contends that even if one accepts every argument
advanced for a procedural due process right of post-conviction access to

90

Harvey II, 285 F.3d at 314 (Luttig, J., respecting the denial of rehearing en
banc).
91
See, e.g., id. at 318.
92
Id.; Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 72, at 570; see also, e.g., Arthur v.
King, No. 2:07-cv-319-WKW, slip op. at 8 (M D. Ala. Aug. 17, 2007)
(declining to find a violation of procedural due process where DNA evidence
would not have enough probative weight exculpate the individual seeking
access).
93
Harvey II, 285 F.3d at 315 (Luttig, J., respecting the denial of rehearing en
banc). No other circuits have attempted to define such a right.
94
Wade v. Brady, 460 F.Supp.2d 226, 249 (D. Mass. 2006).
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DNA evidence, this right does not exist, nor has it been infringed in
McKithen’s case.
¶23
In McKithen’s case, it is logically impossible that any DNA
evidence produced could be conclusively exculpatory. In fact it has little, if
no, probative value. At trial, the knife used against McKithen’s estranged
wife was never fingerprinted, nor was it subjected to DNA testing. 95
However, since DNA remains stable over time, it still may be possible to
locate DNA on the knife and subject such DNA to testing. 96 The
prosecution argued at trial that McKithen appeared at the home of his
estranged wife, grabbed a knife from the kitchen, stabbed her as she was
fleeing, and fled the apartment. 97 Therefore, at least two types of DNA
could possibly be found on the knife—DNA from the victim and DNA from
cells left on fingerprints by the attacker.

No result that is obtainable from a DNA test could logically
exculpate McKithen from his crime. First, the presence of McKithen’s
DNA on the knife will logically inculpate him. Second, a lack of
McKithen’s DNA on the knife is also perfectly consistent with the
prosecution’s theory of the case. This is not a case in which the evidence in
question consists of blood traces left by an assailant, or semen, both of
which, if found, can be tested and potentially used conclusively to tie an
individual to a crime. 98 Here, the prosecution argued that the assailant only
touched the knife. One does not necessarily leave enough DNA for testing
wherever one touches. 99 McKithen could have grabbed the knife and used
it on his estranged wife without leaving a sufficient amount of his own
DNA behind. Although DNA can be recovered and successfully tested a
substantial amount of time after it was deposited, it also is possible that any
DNA evidence that could have originally been present on the knife may not
have survived in a condition suitable for testing. 100 Thus, there are a
number of reasons why it is possible that DNA testing may not reveal a
DNA match for McKithen. Third, if the DNA of another, unidentified
individual is found on the knife, there are non-exculpatory explanations for
this: someone other than the wife had previously visited the apartment and
used the knife. In addition, a rogue skin cell or two could have
contaminated the knife during the time it has been held in evidence. 101 In
¶24

95

McKithen, 481 F.3d at 94.
NAT’L INST. FOR JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 21.
97
McKithen, 481 F.3d at 93–94.
98
See NAT’L INST. FOR JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 21–22.
99
Rebecca Kanable, DNA from Fingerprints?, L. ENFORCEMENT TECH., July
2005, at 66, available at http://www.officer.com/print/Law-EnforcementTechnology/DNA-from-Fingerprints/1$25197.
100
Id.
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See Van Oorschor & Jones, supra note 16, at 768.
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sum, there is no way that any finding made based on the DNA on the knife
could conclusively exculpate McKithen.
¶25
Based on the nature of any potential DNA evidence in McKithen’s
case, McKithen is incapable of asserting a constitutional right to postconviction access to DNA evidence under the actual innocence argument,
the Brady argument, or the access to the courts argument. All three of these
theories require that the DNA evidence requested have the potential to
actually be probatively exculpatory. 102 Since any DNA evidence produced
from the knife would not have any exculpatory value, a right of access to
the knife for testing does not exist in McKithen’s case.

Under the fourth theory posited, a post-conviction right of access to
DNA could derive from a prisoner’s residual liberty interest. 103 Assuming,
arguendo, that the district court concludes a liberty interest which should be
protected through a post-conviction right of access to DNA evidence does
exist in McKithen’s case, this iBrief argues that he has already received
adequate procedure to protect this interest and therefore, such a right has not
been infringed.
¶26

¶27
If such a post-conviction liberty interest is constitutionally
cognizable in McKithen’s case, procedural due process applies to its
deprivation. 104 The Second Circuit instructed the district court to use the
framework established by the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge 105 for
analyzing procedural due process claims. Mathews applies where an
individual has a liberty or property interest that the government seeks to
eliminate. 106 The test set forth in Mathews is used to determine the
administrative and judicial procedures constitutionally required. 107

The Second Circuit notes that the Mathews test is the appropriate
one to use given that McKithen is seeking post-conviction access to
evidence. 108 The court remarks that a higher standard would apply if
McKithen were bringing a challenge to his underlying conviction or to “the
process afforded during criminal proceedings themselves.” 109 However,
here, McKithen is not directly bringing a challenge to his conviction
because evidence of innocence provided by tests performed on the
theoretically exculpatory DNA evidence he seeks would be a prerequisite
¶28

102

See supra Part II.A–C.
See supra Part II.D.
104
McKithen v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89, 107 (2d Cir. 2007).
105
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
106
Grayson v. King, 460 F.3d 1328, 1340 (11th Cir. 2006).
107
Id.
108
McKithen, 481 F.3d at 107.
109
Id. (quoting Krimstock v. Kelly, 464 F.3d 246, 254 (2d Cir. 2006)).
103
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for a direct challenge. In addition, he is not challenging the rules of
criminal procedure used to determine his guilt or innocence. 110
¶29

The Mathews framework is the following:
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally
requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private
interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of
an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 111

¶30
Due process “is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as
the particular situation demands” 112 and “is not a technical conception with
a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstance.” 113 Recognizing
the non-rigid nature of due process, the Second Circuit advises that “[u]nder
Mathews the cases inevitably turn on their particular facts – which in the
instant case include the availability or statutory avenues of relief, such as
state or federal legislation providing for DNA testing, and the seriousness of
the crime and sentence involved.” 114 The court also draws attention to the
potential cost to the state as a factor to be considered. 115

1. The private interest that will be affected by the official action
¶31
McKithen’s alleged private interest in obtaining access to the
evidence at issue is arguably a substantial one. Such an interest would
probably be classified as a liberty interest remaining after conviction (a
“residual liberty interest”) in freedom from restraint and to pursue freedom
from confinement. 116 As noted, there is much debate as to whether such an
interest is constitutionally cognizable. 117 It is sufficient for the purposes of
this analysis to assume that some such interest exists and that it holds some
constitutional weight.

110

See id.
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
112
McKithen, 481 F.3d at 107–08 (quoting Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal
& Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 12 (1979)).
113
Id. at 108 (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334).
114
Id. at 107–08.
115
Id. at 108.
116
Harvey II, 285 F.3d 298, 313 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig, J., respecting the denial
of rehearing en banc).
117
See Grayson v. King, 460 F.3d 1328, 1340–41 (11th Cir. 2006) (noting the
disagreement on whether or not a liberty interest under the due process clause
residually survives final conviction and sentencing).
111
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2. The risk of an erroneous deprivation and other procedural safeguards
¶32
The risk of an erroneous deprivation of whatever continued liberty
interest McKithen has is low. In addition, McKithen has received the
benefit of other procedural safeguards. 118 Therefore, this factor weighs
against McKithen. First, McKithen was found guilty by a jury at a fair trial
in which no prosecutorial misconduct was alleged. 119 He received an
appeal in which his conviction was affirmed; it was determined that his
conviction was not against the weight of the evidence. 120 Seven years after
his conviction, McKithen moved to compel DNA testing of the knife
admitted into evidence in accordance with a New York provision providing
for post-conviction DNA testing under certain circumstances. 121 The New
York provision required that testing shall only be granted upon a
determination that “if a DNA test had been conducted on such evidence,
and if the results had been admitted in the trial resulting in the judgment,
there exists a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been more
favorable to the defendant.” 122 The Queens County Court denied his
motion, concluding that “there is no reasonable probability that the results
of such testing would have resulted in a verdict more favorable to
[McKithen].” 123
¶33
The Second Circuit notes that the Mathews analysis depends in part
on “adequate statutory avenues for relief.” 124 The New York legislature,
cognizant of the reality of wrongful convictions, enacted a statute providing
for post-conviction testing of potentially exculpatory DNA testing. 125 In
fact, New York was the first such state to so do. 126 The New York
legislature has provided an opportunity for prisoners for whom DNA
evidence has the potential to exculpate to be granted access to this
evidence. 127 Here, it was determined that there is no “reasonable

118

See McKithen, 481 F.3d at 94. McKithen received an appeal, on which his
conviction was affirmed. Id. He also received the opportunity to request access
to DNA evidence under the relevant New York statute, of which he availed
himself. Id.
119
Id.
120
People v. McKithen, 634 N.Y.S.2d 128, 129 (1995).
121
McKithen, 481 F.3d at 94.
122
Id. (citing N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.30(1-a)(a) (McKinney 2004)).
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.30(1-a)(a) (McKinney 2004).
126
The Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/395.php
(last visited Aug. 18, 2008).
127
The New York statute requires that the court grant access to forensic DNA
testing “if a DNA test had been conducted on such evidence [at trial], and if the
results had been admitted in the trial resulting in the judgment, there exists a
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probability that the verdict would have been more favorable to [McKithen]”
even if any results of the DNA testing had originally been admitted at
trial. 128 The court arguably made such a determination about the probative
value of any DNA evidence for the same reasons articulated above as to
why any DNA evidence could not be conclusively exculpatory. Here,
McKithen received, by way of the New York post-conviction DNA testing
statute, an additional procedural safeguard under which he could have
obtained access to the evidence if it could have helped him to overturn his
verdict. Consequently, any risk of an erroneous deprivation of McKithen’s
liberty interest in seeking freedom from confinement is low. If any DNA
evidence produced would have assisted him in his endeavor, he would have
been granted access to the DNA evidence under this statute. 129
3. The Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail
¶34
The third factor of the Mathews analysis favors the denial of access
to DNA evidence in McKithen’s case, although it appears that such a
conclusion is best supported only when any DNA evidence produced would
lack the potential to exculpate the prisoner. The government has a
compelling interest in the finality of duly adjudicated criminal judgments.130
The government also has strong interests in “guarding against a flood of
requests . . . and ensuring closure for victims and survivors.” 131
¶35
In McKithen’s case, the government will bear no fiscal burden in
permitting access to evidence for DNA testing since McKithen volunteered
to cover the costs of testing himself. 132 McKithen does not challenge the
state’s procedures for the collection and storage of biological evidence. 133
Such a challenge would naturally trigger a valid concern as to cost. 134 Here,
McKithen simply seeks access to evidence already available. 135 In addition,

reasonable probability that the verdict would have been more favorable to the
defendant.” N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.30(1-a)(a) (McKinney 2004).
128
McKithen, 481 F.3d at 94.
129
See supra text accompanying note 127.
130
Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 555 (1998).
131
Grayson v. King, 460 F.3d 1328, 1342 (11th Cir. 2006).
132
McKithen, 481 F.3d at 108. DNA testing can cost as much as $5,000.
Gwendolyn Carroll, Comment, Proven Guilty: An Examination of the PenaltyFree World of Post-Conviction DNA Testing, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
665, 666 (2007). Almost every state that provides for post-conviction testing
funds the testing for indigent petitioners and requires solvent petitioners to
advance the funding for the test. Id. at 669.
133
McKithen, 481 F.3d at 109.
134
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the government has likely incurred a greater cost in opposing McKithen’s
request for access to DNA evidence than it would if the request had been
granted.
If the results of the DNA test were to confirm McKithen’s guilt,
then the state’s interest in the finality of judgments would no doubt be
served. If the results prove inconclusive, the state has still incurred no cost.
If the results of the test could provide material evidence of factual
innocence, the government’s interest in the finality of judgments is no
longer at issue, because the government cannot have a finality interest in
imprisoning an innocent person.136 In addition, the interests of the victim in
this case, McKithen’s estranged wife, would arguably have to cede to
McKithen’s interest in pursuing release, exculpatory evidence in hand. 137
¶36

However, as previously noted, even if McKithen were to receive a
favorable result from the DNA evidence, it would lack the power to shine
real doubt upon his conviction. Any potential result obtained through DNA
analysis is consistent with the prosecution’s theory of the case at trial.
Therefore, the state’s interest in the finality of judgments and the interests
of the victim arguably weigh against reopening a case in which there is no
possibility of calling the verdict into question.

¶37

4. Weighing the Mathews factors
¶38
In McKithen’s case, the Mathews factors call for a finding that
McKithen’s due process rights have not been violated by the procedure he
was afforded. Due to the factual nature of any DNA evidence in his case,
he lacks the possibility of being exculpated. Though the cost and burden to
the state in affording access to the DNA evidence are arguably negligible,
the lack of probative value of any evidence produced weighs against a grant
of access.
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See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110–11 (reaffirming that the
government’s “overriding interest [is] that ‘justice shall be done’”); see also In
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[The]
fundamental value determination of our society is that it is far worse to convict
an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.”).
137
See Wade v. Brady, 460 F. Supp. 2d 226, 249 (D. Mass. 2006) (“Victims
may have an interest in moving on but they do not have an interest in
imprisoning the wrong person.”).
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III. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND POST-CONVICTION ACCESS TO
DNA EVIDENCE
¶39
A post-conviction right of access to DNA evidence does not fall
within the realm of previously recognized substantive due process rights. 138
Substantive due process, though controversial, is firmly enshrined in
constitutional jurisprudence. 139 Rights protected through substantive due
process are those which are “fundamental,” found in the history and
traditions of England and America, and ''implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty.” 140 The Supreme Court teaches that the “Due Process Clause
“bar[s] certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the
procedures used to implement them.” 141 Post-conviction access to DNA
evidence has never been explicitly held to constitute such a fundamental
right. 142 However, the view has been advanced that under established
Supreme Court precedent there may be a substantive due process right to
access evidence for the purposes of post-conviction DNA testing. 143 The
following arguments have been submitted for the proposition that a
substantive due process right of post-conviction access to DNA evidence
may exist.

A. Right of access to evidence
¶40
A substantive due process right to post-conviction DNA testing
may fall within a substantive due process right of access to evidence. Under
this view,

the right of access to evidence is sufficiently supported by the history
and traditions that our criminal justice system be fair and that the
innocent not be wrongfully deprived of their liberty, and by our nowsettled practice, adopted in pursuit of the same interests, that all
potentially exculpatory evidence be provided to the accused in
advance of trial (and even to the convicted post-trial, if previously
known to the government). 144

Such an argument contends that a right of access to evidence is rooted in
Anglo-American jurisprudence. However, DNA testing has fundamentally
138

Harvey II, 285 F.3d 298, 311 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig, J., respecting the denial
of rehearing en banc).
139
McKithen, 481 F.3d at 107 n.17 (citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523
U.S. 833, 856–57 (1998)).
140
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
141
Harvey II, 285 F.3d at 318 (Luttig, J., respecting the denial of rehearing en
banc) (citing Daniels v. Williams 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)).
142
See id. at 311 (Luttig, J., respecting the denial of rehearing en banc).
143
Id. at 318.
144
Id. at 319.
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changed the very nature of evidence and has opened up a new possibility for
the production of conclusive, potentially exculpatory evidence after an
individual has already been convicted. 145 Therefore, this right of access to
evidence should reflect the new realities of technology and encompass
access to this new type of evidence. 146

B. Right to be free from arbitrary governmental action
¶41
Proponents of a substantive due process right to post-conviction
DNA testing have advanced the notion that such a right could be grounded
in an individual’s right to be free from arbitrary governmental action. 147 It
is a constitutional principle that the due process clause was “intended to
secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of
government.” 148 The Supreme Court has defined arbitrary governmental
action as including “the exercise of power without any reasonable
justification in the service of a legitimate governmental objective.” 149
However, the Supreme Court has ruled that the abuse of power needs to rise
to the level of that which “shocks the conscience” for a due process
violation to be found – thus providing a doctrinal failsafe for emergency
situations. 150 In certain post conviction access to evidence cases, where the
evidence withheld has the capability to conclusively exculpate a prisoner,
the refusal to turn it over might arguably rise to this shocking level. One
could indeed claim that it is

shockingly arbitrary that the government would literally dispose of the
evidence used to deny one of his liberty (if not his right to life) before
it would turn that evidence over to the individual, when he steadfastly
maintains his factual innocence and ask only that he be allowed to
subject that evidence to tests which, it is conceded, given the evidence
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See Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 72, at 595.
Harvey II, 285 F.3d at 315 n.6 (Luttig, J., respecting the denial of rehearing
en banc) (citing City of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998)
(Kennedy & O’Connor, JJ., concurring) (“It must be added that history and
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note 72, at 601.
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(1986)).
149
Id.
150
See id.
146

2008

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 7

introduced at trial in support of conviction, could prove him absolutely
innocent of the crime. 151

But if the evidence sought would provide no conclusive information about
the prisoner’s guilt or innocence, an argument that denial of access “shocks
the conscience” appears substantially less convincing.

C. Substantive due process in McKithen’s case
Even if a right of access for post-conviction DNA testing can
sometimes be found through the doctrine of substantive due process, this
right does not exist in McKithen’s case. As discussed above with respect to
procedural due process, even a favorable result from the DNA testing would
not conclusively exculpate McKithen, nor shine serious doubt on his
conviction in light of the overwhelming evidence against him. Having so
concluded, the government in not acting arbitrarily in denying McKithen
access to the DNA evidence. It is in no way shocking to the conscience that
the government could have concluded that there are no circumstances under
which the evidence would be exculpatory and therefore the interests of
finality and conservation of resources favor denial of access. Furthermore,
no right of access can be recognized when the evidence is not potentially
exculpatory. No general substantive due process right of access to all
evidence in the state’s possession has ever been recognized. Therefore,
even if one accepts the arguments advanced for a limited substantive due
process right to post-conviction access, the right does not exist in this
factual circumstance.
¶42

CONCLUSION
¶43
The Second Circuit charged the district court with a weighty task
when it asked the court to consider the existence and boundaries of a
constitutional post-conviction right of access to DNA evidence grounded in
due process jurisprudence. The revolutionary technology of DNA testing,
which has the potential to conclusively exculpate, may merit the recognition
of an interest in accessing evidence for potentially exonerative DNA testing.
However, where it is impossible that the evidence sought could ever prove
exculpatory, the recognition of a right of access to evidence for DNA
testing is not supported by current constitutional doctrine or reasonable
extensions thereof. There is no logical possibility that the potential DNA
evidence sought by McKithen could exculpate him from his crime.
Therefore, the district should conclude that even if it accepts the arguments
proposing that a post-conviction right of access to evidence for DNA testing
may sometimes exist, such a right does not exist under the circumstances of
McKithen’s case.
151

Id. at 319–20.
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POSTSCRIPT
¶44
Since the time that the body of this iBrief was written, Brown
petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was denied on
February 19, 2008. 152 In July of 2008, the district court for the Eastern
District of New York decided McKithen v. Brown on remand. 153 Judge
Gleeson, in a thorough, forty-eight page opinion, held that prisoners do
indeed retain a constitutionally-protected post-conviction liberty interest in
meaningful access to existing executive mechanisms of clemency. 154 He
then determined that McKithen was entitled to access to the knife for the
purposes of DNA testing as a matter of procedural due process. 155 In dicta,
he further announced that under some circumstances, a substantive due
process right of access to evidence for DNA testing exists. 156
¶45
Judge Gleeson considered the arguments highlighted by this iBrief
and ultimately found the argument advocating a residual liberty interest in
meaningful access to clemency mechanisms to be persuasive. 157 He framed
the origin of the right in terms of a “prosecutor’s duty to seek justice,”
noting that such a duty continues after a conviction becomes final. 158 After
conviction, that duty requires a prosecutor to “disclose only such evidence
which, if the defendant had access to it but was erroneously prevented from
using it, would deprive the defendant of either of his remaining rights
relating to guilt or innocence”—one of those rights being that of access to
the courts and the other, that of meaningful access to clemency
proceedings. 159
¶46
Drawing an analogy to transcripts of habeas corpus proceedings, to
which a prisoner’s access is constitutionally required, Judge Gleeson
concluded that “the fact that evidence of innocence is neither sufficient nor
strictly necessary for a favorable outcome does not indicate that it can never
be required by the right of meaningful access to existing clemency
mechanisms.” 160 Instead, “like such a transcript, the evidence of innocence
must be forceful enough to be practically necessary in a plea for clemency
based on innocence.” 161 Addressing the requisite reliability of such
evidence he determined that “evidence of innocence that is of
152
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unimpeachable reliability is practically necessary if it undermines
confidence in the outcome of the trial.” 162
¶47
After conducting the appropriate Mathews balancing, Judge
Gleeson held as follows:

After balancing this interest against the government's interests in light
of the risk of erroneous deprivation and the probable value of
additional safeguards, I conclude that in states possessing some
clemency mechanism (including a parole system) which can reduce or
undo a prisoner's sentence based on the ground that the prisoner is
actually innocent, and at least where, as here, the tests can be
performed effectively without imposing non-negligible fiscal or other
burdens on the government or subjecting an individual to
nonconsensual DNA testing not otherwise authorized by law, a
prisoner has a right to access physical evidence for the purpose of
DNA testing if: the physical evidence is in the possession of the
government; the testing is nonduplicative; and assuming exculpatory
results, the results of the testing would undermine confidence in the
outcome of trial. 163
¶48
As the Second Circuit explicitly instructed the district court to
consider a substantive due process foundation for a post-conviction right of
access to DNA evidence, Judge Gleeson discussed the circumstances under
which he would find that denial of access to physical evidence for DNA
testing shocks the conscience and therefore constitutes arbitrary
governmental action barred by the dictates of constitutional substantive due
process. 164 Judge Gleeson

would conclude that if a prosecutor refuses a prisoner's specific
request for access to physical evidence for DNA testing, in
circumstances where the testing could be performed at negligible cost
to the state and the results of the testing, if exculpatory, would prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the prisoner did not commit the crime
for which she is incarcerated, the prosecutor exhibits deliberate
indifference to the possibility that the prisoner is actually innocent. 165

This deliberate indifference in circumstances when the results could be
conclusively exculpatory “shocks the conscience” and therefore, a prisoner
has a substantive due process right to be free from such arbitrary
governmental conduct. 166 However, because the probative value of the
evidence in McKithen’s case is so low, Judge Gleeson rightly did not find
162
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that the governmental action in McKithen’s case to rose to this demanding
standard.
¶49
Judge Gleeson turned then to McKithen’s procedural due process
claim. Under his previous analysis, the potential DNA evidence would, if
exculpatory, need to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial to
require the government to release the knife to McKithen. 167 He feels it is
necessary to assume that the results would be exculpatory, which in this
case, means assuming that DNA belonging to a criminal in a DNA database
collected for law enforcement purposes is found on the knife. 168 Even in
the highly unlikely event that such DNA were found, McKithen would not
be conclusively exculpated, as multiple eyewitness accounts as well as his
own statements provided strong evidence against him. Indeed Judge
Gleeson correctly noted that even the presence of such DNA would not
change the result of McKithen’s trial, given all the other evidence the
government possessed against him. 169 However, he did conclude that such
a finding would undermine confidence in McKithen’s trial, and as a result,
access to the DNA evidence was constitutionally required. 170

Judge Gleeson’s analysis correctly weights the importance of postconviction DNA testing and appropriately concludes that there are
circumstances under which it is constitutionally required. However, his
formulation of the procedural due process right, which requires the
assumption of exculpatory results and demands testing when the results
would undermine confidence in the trial is too weak of a hurdle to
overcome and invites frivolous demands for testing. If one must assume
that skin cells from a criminal in a law enforcement database are on any
objects associated with a crime, no matter how unlikely that scenario is,
virtually any request for access to any object in evidence will present a
situation in which DNA testing must be ordered. If the Constitution
demands such testing, then prisoners should indeed receive it. However, it
is unclear whether the dictates of procedural due process truly extend that
far, and courts should be wary of reading them in such an expansive
manner.
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